Banking on Failure
To understand the systemic risk posed by cases like Idrisov’s, one must revisit Kazakhstan’s banking sector — an ecosystem that, over the last fifteen years, has undergone multiple bailouts, restructurings, and collapses.
At the heart of it lies a practice familiar to financial regulators worldwide: related-party lending. Several of Idrisov’s companies received large loans from banks where he or his associates had influence. These loans were often made without conventional due diligence, secured with questionable guarantees, or routed through complex holding structures. When repayment faltered, the banks faltered too — and the state stepped in.
Idrisov’s involvement in RBK Bank, Qazaq Banki, and other financial institutions is well-documented. But in the aftermath of their failures, it is typically mid-level executives who face trial. The masterminds behind loan chains and ownership webs rarely make headlines — unless they die.
In Ibrahim’s case, the official story remains that of a remorseful financier. But as one investigator noted off-record: “He wasn’t the top of the ladder. And yet he’s the one who disappears. That tells you something about how the system works.”
Offshoring the Outcome
If the domestic record of non-repayment is lengthy, the international trail is equally complex. Journalistic investigations and financial disclosures suggest that Idrisov has transferred or sheltered assets in multiple foreign jurisdictions, including Singapore, Cyprus, Turkey, and Latvia.
In one example, investigators uncovered a Latvian bank account linked to an associate containing over €7,000. In another, corporate documents listed beneficial ownerships under layers of limited partnerships and trusts, shielded from direct regulatory view. These are not necessarily illegal actions — but they are hard to reconcile with a man who, on paper, still owes tens of millions to his home country.
Kazakhstan’s authorities have not released any information about efforts to recover offshore assets or seek international cooperation. It is unclear whether such efforts are even underway. And that silence, more than anything else, is becoming the core of the problem.
Public Debt, Private Amnesia
The broader economic stakes are not abstract. Every tenge unrecovered from defaulted loans is a tenge that must be compensated by public funds — whether through recapitalizations, asset write-downs, or inflationary budget shifts. In a country still struggling with income inequality and declining trust in institutions, these unaddressed liabilities feed public cynicism.
Kazakhstan is not alone in facing these challenges. Across emerging markets, the ability to pursue well-connected debtors is often the dividing line between governance and façade. But observers note that Kazakhstan’s current trajectory — where wealthy defaulters face little visible consequence — risks turning banking into an extractive tool, rather than a productive one.
The Politics of Non-Pursuit
Why, then, has the state not moved more forcefully?
The answer, according to regional experts, lies in the complex calculus of influence. Idrisov, like other oligarchs of his generation, is deeply embedded in Kazakhstan’s political and economic machinery. He has never held public office, but his companies intersect with nearly every major infrastructure initiative of the last decade. To challenge him legally would be to challenge the architecture in which many powerful figures have stakes.
Moreover, Kazakhstan’s legal institutions, while formally independent, often defer to political considerations in high-profile economic cases. Prosecution of such figures could be seen as destabilizing — or, more cynically, unprofitable.
