China’s Submarine Missile Test Looks Routine. The Real Story is the Panic it Triggered

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

By James Dwyer, University of Tasmania

On Monday, a Chinese navy submarine fired a long-range ballistic missile into international waters in the South Pacific. The nuclear-capable missile, which was launched from underwater and carried an inert dummy warhead, is believed to have splashed down near Tuvalu.

The Chinese government said the event “was a routine part of China’s annual military training program” and was “not directed against any specific country or target”. It added that other countries had been notified, and urged them not to “over-interpret it”.

Reactions from Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan and Japan were immediate and pointed, with Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong calling the test “destabilising”.

Commentators were quick to link the test to a new defence pact between Australia and Fiji, signed earlier that day. On this view, the test was intended as an intimidating reminder that Beijing’s missiles can reach throughout the Pacific.

Routine testing?

Every nuclear power that operates strategic ballistic missiles, be they submarine-launched or land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, periodically test-fires unarmed missiles to confirm the weapons still work, retain their range, and can hit their targets accurately. In the past few years, similar tests have been carried out by the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and India.

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The Chinese test in itself is nothing new, or particularly alarming. It is part of the basic maintenance of a nuclear arsenal. The tests are not frequent, but they are routine. This one coincided with the beginning of China’s annual naval exercises with Russia.

It’s not at all clear the test or its timing were intended as intimidations.

What submarine-launched missiles are for

China maintains a declared no-first-use policy regarding nuclear weapons, meaning it will only use them in retaliation to the use of nukes by somebody else.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles exist specifically to provide a “second strike” capability – they would survive a nuclear attack on the Chinese mainland, most likely from a major power such as the US, and could be used to respond.

Testing a strategic second-strike capability to intimidate middle and small powers such as Australia, Fiji and other Pacific nations makes little sense. Chinese land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles can already reach as far as Australia and Pacific Island nations.

Submarine-launched missiles like the one tested are deterrents aimed at other nuclear powers, to ensure the credibility of their deterrent even in the event of an overwhelming first strike that completely destroys their land-based nuclear arsenals.

If China really wanted to intimidate Fiji, for example, it would be a lot cheaper and more effective to fly a strategic bomber through or near Fijian airspace, or sail an aircraft carrier battle-group nearby.

Poor handling

None of this means China handled the test well. The Australian government has complained it received notice of the test only hours beforehand, which it says is “not consistent” with The Hague convention on ballistic missile testing.

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This is a legitimate concern, as even an unarmed missile poses significant risks to aircraft and shipping in the area, and it’s worth China addressing. But a scramble on notice timing is a different problem from the question of whether the test itself was provocative.

The deeper issue is the asymmetry in how these tests are received. If the US had tested a submarine-launched missile in the Pacific, it’s unlikely Australia or any other US ally would have blinked.

So perhaps what has really provoked the response is not so much the missile itself or the short notice. The issue is watching a potential future adversary show off a capability every other nuclear power already possesses, and regularly exercises.

A question of perspective

With all that said, a political dimension to China’s motivation for the test and its timing can’t be ruled out. But we can’t know it from the evidence available.

It’s inarguable the test shows a nuclear-armed China continuing to build and rehearse the same kind of deterrent architecture other nuclear powers rely on. Whether that reads as a routine technical milestone or a geopolitical warning shot may depend less on the missile itself than on who is watching it.

[KS]

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