How Boeing Went from Aviation Industry’s Top Name to Delivering Aircrafts Without Proper Security Scrutiny; And a Whistleblower Who Paid With His Life

Key Points

BOEING COMPANY has established itself as a leading player in state-of-the-art aerospace engineering. The firm has built a reputation on  its major emphasis on layers of added security and fail-safe features in its aircrafts. For a large part of the twentieth century, Boeing prioritized safety of passengers, technological advancements, and top-notch aerospace engineering. It prided itself as a firm that was driven largely by its engineers rather than quarterly earnings. 

It all changed when Boeing merged with the American aerospace manufacturing corporation and defense contractor McDonnell Douglas in 1997.  After the merger, Boeing’s priorities shifted and started stunting towards shareholder returns, production targets, and cost discipline. Engineers who once held authority were overpowered by financial executives who only sought profit and wanted to produce aircrafts faster and cheaper. 

How Cost-Cutting Changed Boeing's Safety Culture 

Fatigued employees, skipped installation procedures, poor electrical bonding and grounding, unqualified workers performing crucial electrical work, rushing of functional system testing, and removal of long-established quality inspections were some of the “dangerous practices” that whistleblower Ed Pierson had flagged in multiple Boeing programs. 

Pierson is a former Boeing engineer, who now serves as executive director of the Foundation of Aviation Safety, a non-profit organization dedicated to informing the public about critical issues involving aviation safety.

The 787 Dreamliner program, in particular, bore the impacts of this huge shift in Boeing’s priorities. The line was touted one of  the “safest” aircraft lines within the company’s entire operation. Boeing describes the Dreamliner as offering “advanced aerodynamics, more efficient engines, and more electric systems.” The 787 Dreamliner programme was officially launched in 2004, years after Boeing’s cost-cutting practices started.

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On April 2, 2025, Boeing’s chief executive officer (CEO) Kelly Ortberg appeared before the US Senate’s Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee. He reiterated  Boeing’s commitment to ensure safety and testified before US senators that  he is “happy” with the company’s progress in “improving manufacturing and safety practices.” Three months later, on June 12, 2025, the Air India Flight 171, which was a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner aircraft, crashed 32 seconds after takeoff in Ahmedabad, Gujrat, allegedly due to technical and infrastructure failures. 

A Whistleblower Who Paid With His Life

Boeing didn't take well to employees who would raise security concerns and accused the company of deliberately fitting the plane with below-standard elements to decrease costs and speedrun the production process. In its early years of production, as Boeing outsourced its supply chain, the airframe of many Dreamliner airplanes sat untouched for many years because they didn't meet delivery standards. 

John Barnett, who was a quality control manager at Boeing’s South Carolina facility working from 1988 till his retirement in 2017, flagged his concerns and submitted his findings under the Federal Aviation Administration's whistleblower program. He also revealed how in other aircraft programs, Boeing workers were put under relentless pressure and how management dismissed safety concerns. Two days later, on March 9, 2024, Barnett was found dead due to a gunshot wound.  Even authorities found no foul play in his death, his death had prevented other employees who had similar concerns.

Another Boeing whistleblower, Sam Salehpour, spoke up about how the fuselage assembly process in the 787 production process was flawed. He highlighted how workers would forcibly misalign barrel sections together, even physically jumping on planes to do so, which led to gaps between the plane’s physical elements. Over time, this could result in structural failure in aircrafts long before their intended lifespan.

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Even after all these security concerns flagged by whistleblowers, Boeing maintained that their Dreamliner 787 line remained “safe.”

How the Common Core System Works in the Boeing 787 

One of the top selling points of the Dreamliner line is the common core system (CCS). 

The CCS acts as the central nervous system and manages a wide range of aircraft functions, from monitoring maintenance needs to managing cabin systems. Essentially, CCS connects both flight critical systems (like flight control computers) and non flight critical systems (such as in-flight entertainment and cabin air conditioning). However, it also means that the failure of one system can cause issues in other systems. Traditional aircraft utilized dedicated systems to manage flight function, which worked independent of each other.

Hailed as a “represents a major advancement in aviation information systems,” CCS was another one of such “cost-cutting measures” that Boeing employed in the production of the Dreamliner fleet. 

Air India's Boeing 787 Dreamliner Purchase 

In 2005–2006, Air India, then owned by the government, signed a deal with Boeing to purchase twenty-seven 787 Dreamliner aircrafts to induct in its airfleet. The deal formed part of the much larger decision, which also included the purchase of 43 Airbus aircrafts for Indian Airlines.

When Air Indian and Indian Airlines were merged in 2007, at that time, the Dreamliner line wasn't even in production and faced several years of delays. Global technical and certification issues, in addition to issues over design and production problems related to the plane's heavy electrical architecture and lithium-ion battery systems, were some hurdles that the Dreamliner 787 plane line faced in its early days. 

VT-ANB, the official registered name of the Air Indian Flight 171 which crashed seconds after takeoff in Ahmedabad, Gujrat, was a Boeing Dreamliner 787 that was part of the early generations of Dreamliner airplanes inducted into India’s air fleet.

VT-ANB's History of Technical and Electrical Problems 

Ed Pierson and Joe Jacobsen, Boeing whistleblowers associated with the Foundation for Aviation Safety, appeared before the US Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and submitted their report which highlighted how since its maiden years in service starting from 2014, VT-ANB has faced significant electrical systems problems.

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In 2014, the plane had an issue with its fire inerter, which prevented an explosion in the fuel tank by supplying it with nitrogen-enriched air. The fire inerter was replaced. Then in January 2022, a major electrical fire occurred in its P100 distribution panel, which is one of the central nodes in the airplane’s integrated electrical architecture. The plane was stranded in Frankfurt as a result. The same thing happened again, and the plane’s P100 distribution panel was replaced twice in the plane’s lifespan. In January 2023, the plane’s generator and power distribution collapsed.

On the VT-ANB’s last flight, on the unfortunate day of June 12, 2025, all three systems — the power distribution, the generator, and the inverter powering the fine inverter — failed simultaneously.

The Foundation for Aviation Safety’s report points towards a pattern of recurring issues occurring in VT-ANB’s core electrical and computing infrastructure. The Foundation alleged that employees of Boeing and Air India deliberately concealed critical safety and defect information that ultimately doomed the airplane.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the tragic crash of the Air India Flight 171 was due to the recurring chronological technical failures that the aircraft has been experiencing, and a larger fault lies with Boeing’s repeated history of undermining security processes and producing aircrafts that are below-standard as a cost-cutting measure.

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