

Key Points
Tajikistan has passed sweeping restrictions on hijabs, beards, and “foreign” Islamic dress as part of a decades-long campaign to suppress public religiosity.
Similar controls exist across Central Asia, shaped by Soviet-era secularism and current authoritarian politics.
The policies raise global questions about bodily autonomy and state policing of dress, whether through compulsion or prohibition.
Central Asia occupies a unique position in the global Muslim landscape. The Muslim-majority states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are all products of the Soviet Union, where religion was tightly controlled for seventy years. Mosques were shut, clergy were monitored, and Islamic education was either banned or absorbed into state-run institutions.
When the USSR collapsed in 1991, independence brought a cultural revival, including renewed interest in Islam. But the newly independent states inherited the Soviet model of regulating religion as a potential driver of extremism and threat to national stability.
Over three decades later, this unease has produced a regional pattern: visible religious expression is tolerated only within strict limits, and states retain sweeping authority to regulate clothing, religious teaching, and community leadership. Tajikistan has taken this further than any of its neighbours.
Tajikistan is a Muslim-majority country, yet its government has spent nearly two decades curbing public expressions of faith. These restrictions intensified under President Emomali Rahmon, who has ruled since the mid-1990s after serving in the Soviet-era state structures of the Tajik SSR. His political rise came during the civil war that followed independence, and since then he has consolidated authority through an increasingly centralised and authoritarian system.
Rahmon’s government regularly warns that overt religious practice threatens national stability and undermines Tajik cultural heritage. Officials argue that hijabs, niqabs, long beards and certain religious celebrations represent foreign influence, particularly from the Arab world. The government insists that Tajiks should instead maintain traditional dress, often described as modest clothing associated with national heritage.
Rahmon has repeatedly framed these restrictions as a defence of Tajik identity. He has publicly criticised “alien clothing” and urged citizens to reject styles he associates with external religious influences. The government has used this narrative to support policies that regulate appearance and behaviour in public spaces. Rahmon has said that Tajikistan is a “secular nation built on ancient culture, not imported fanaticism.”
Tajikistan banned the hijab in public institutions in 2007, but recent legislation formalised and expanded the ban across schools, government offices and public places. The new law prohibits Islamic veils and Western miniskirts, instead endorsing traditional Tajik dress as the appropriate public standard. The government also restricts long beards and discourages religious clothing in daily life.
In 2015, Rahmon said that wearing foreign clothes and hijab “is another pressing issue for our society,” calling it a “a sign of poor education.” Over the years, he has defended his actions as fighting against religious extremism.
A key moment in this campaign came in 2018 when Tajikistan published official rules on acceptable dress – The Guidebook of Recommended Outfits in Tajikistan. The guidelines described national attire and warned against what the government called “foreign” clothing. These rules formed the foundation for subsequent enforcement actions and shaped public messaging about identity and social behaviour. The government framed the document as a cultural guide meant to protect Tajik heritage, but in practice it functioned as a regulatory tool targeting religious dress.
The latest law, passed in June 2024, formally bans the hijab and other “Arabic clothing” and religious markers in public spaces. This legal framework came after years of informal pressure. Police have shaved men’s beards at checkpoints, questioned women wearing headscarves, and monitored marketplaces for “foreign dress”. These measures are enforced through fines, compliance monitoring, and media campaigns.
Rahmon often uses regional comparisons to justify Tajikistan’s own restrictions. He has pointed to policies across Central Asia and said that Tajikistan must not “allow foreign trends to divide society.” In speeches marking Independence Day and National Unity Day, the president framed hijab bans as part of a wider effort across the region to maintain secular governance and resist external influences.
Each Central Asian state enforces its own form of control:
Kazakhstan discourages the niqab and face coverings in public institutions and schools. Officials argue that black veils are “non-Kazakh” and represent imported ideologies.
Uzbekistan previously banned the hijab in educational institutions. While there has been some loosening after 2017, restrictions still exist in many government spaces and teachers can be barred from wearing hijabs at work.
Kyrgyzstan does not formally ban the hijab but runs state campaigns warning against “Arabisation” and encourages the wearing of traditional Kyrgyz clothing.
Turkmenistan enforces quiet but strict controls. Reports note bans on black clothing for women, police pressure to remove hijabs, and tight oversight of mosques.
Central Asian society is a contradiction, with Arabic and South Asian interpretations of Islam shaping culture and Soviet influences embedded in law and bureaucracy. As a result, people identify strongly as Muslims but often maintain limited public religious practice.
The debate around Tajikistan’s hijab ban sits within a global pattern of states attempting to regulate women’s bodies through clothing laws. France imposes bans on headscarves in public schools. Iran enforces mandatory hijab rules with state policing. India has seen heated disputes over hijabs in educational institutions. In each case, women are told what they must or must not wear, but the outcome is the same: loss of autonomy.
In Tajikistan, parents have reported being fined for dressing their daughters in headscarves. In Uzbekistan, teachers have been reprimanded for permitting students to attend class wearing hijabs. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, public messaging often links religious clothing to extremism without evidence. In France, the argument is secularism. In Iran, it is religious morality.
This reflects a broader political trend: authoritarian governments using dress as a proxy for ideological loyalty. Visible faith becomes a marker of resistance and controlling it becomes a tool of governance. [Rh]
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