Key Points
NATGRID (National Intelligence Grid) is a counter-terrorism focused intelligence database with information on 119 crore Indians, which allows for mass surveillance and real-time tracking.
NATGRID now handles around 45,000 data requests every month and has been opened to State police at SP rank. The platform has been linked to the National Population Register and upgraded with tools such as Gandiva and Netra.
NATGRID collates data from across repositaries like Aadhaar, social media, and telecom networks. Critics warn of a lack of regulations, safeguards, and accountability in use of the software.
The National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) is steadily embedding itself into India’s policing and intelligence ecosystem. According to recent reporting by The Hindu, the platform is currently receiving close to 45,000 requests every month from law enforcement and security agencies. At the annual Directors General of Police conference held in Raipur between 28 and 30 November 2025, chaired by PM Narendra Modi, agencies were explicitly asked to scale up its use across investigations.
The Ministry of Home Affairs has also urged States to “liberally” use NATGRID to access a wide range of datasets, including driving licence records, Aadhaar registration details, airline passenger data, banking information and even social media accounts linked to specific issues. Access to the database was earlier restricted to limited central agencies, but has now been extended to all Police officers ranking Superintendent and above – a significant expansion in operational reach.
Officials argue that the platform reduces delays by allowing investigators to pull information from multiple databases through a single, secure interface. Instead of writing to different departments, officers can use NATGRID to “join the dots” during investigations or develop intelligence without even registering a First Information Report (FIR). While some State police officials have reported technical hurdles such as slow logins and delays in retrieving data, the broader push from the Centre has been to normalise NATGRID as a routine investigative tool.
Conceptualised in the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, NATGRID was first authorised through an executive order in 2010 under the UPA government. The idea was to prevent intelligence failures by enabling authorised agencies to cross-reference disparate datasets held by government departments and private entities. Over time, it has evolved into a platform that allows secure, real-time querying across categories such as immigration and travel, financial transactions, telecom metadata, vehicle registration, passports and policing databases. Real time GPS tracking, combined with access to personal details of nearly all Indian citizens, makes NATGRID the most comprehensive surveillance and tracking operation in the world.
Initially, access was limited to ten central agencies, including the Intelligence Bureau, Research and Analysis Wing, National Investigation Agency, Enforcement Directorate and the Financial Intelligence Unit. This changed after 2019, when the Home Ministry pushed to resolve inter-agency differences and extend controlled access to State police. NATGRID also signed an agreement with the National Crime Records Bureau in 2020, enabling access to the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems, which links roughly 14,000 police stations nationwide.
See Also: Normalizing surveillance in daily life
One of the most consequential recent developments is the linking of NATGRID with the National Population Register (NPR), which holds family-wise details of around 119 crore residents. While the NPR has not been updated since 2015, it remains a foundational identity and residency database. Officials say this integration improves identity validation and speeds up investigations, but critics point out that NPR is also the first step towards a nationwide National Register of Citizens (NCR), making the linkage politically and socially sensitive.
NATGRID has also been upgraded with advanced analytical tools. The Home Ministry has told Parliament that an Organised Crime Network Database is being built on the platform to improve coordination between the NIA and State Anti-Terror Squads. A key component of this upgrade is Gandiva, an AI-assisted tool for entity resolution and facial recognition. Investigators can upload an image of a suspect, which Gandiva then matches against photo identity documents such as telecom KYC records, vehicle registrations or driving licences.
Alongside Gandiva, surveillance capabilities are being strengthened through systems such as Netra, a network traffic analysis platform developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). Netra enables monitoring and analysis of online activity, including emails, social media posts and internet calls, using keyword filters. Police units, including Delhi Police’s counter-intelligence wing, are upgrading infrastructure to run next-generation versions of this system, allowing faster processing of large volumes of internet data.
Despite its growing footprint, NATGRID operates without a dedicated statutory framework. Its powers are ultimately derived from executive authority and older laws such as the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, which permit interception in the interests of public safety or national security. The Supreme Court has held that surveillance intrudes on the right to privacy under Article 21 and must follow strict procedures, but NATGRID itself remains outside any clear parliamentary oversight regime. A Lok Sabha question from 2019 reveals that NATGRID is exempted from the Right to Information (RTI) Act, meaning it is not open to public scrutiny either.
Civil liberties groups argue that linking population-wide datasets with AI-driven analytics transforms NATGRID from a targeted intelligence tool into a system capable of mass surveillance. The absence of publicly available guidelines on what data can be accessed, under what circumstances and for how long it can be retained fuels concerns of function creep. While officials insist that every query is logged, categorised by sensitivity and subject to senior-level oversight, there is little transparency on how misuse is detected or punished.
Critics also point to India’s recent surveillance controversies, from allegations of spyware use to past cases of unlawful monitoring justified in the name of security – like ‘snoopgate’. They warn that vague invocations of “national security” can blur the line between legitimate intelligence gathering and intrusion into dissent, journalism or political activity. The integration of NPR data, in particular, raises fears of profiling and disproportionate impact on marginalised communities.
This is compounded by the fact that similar vague terminology used in other anti-terror regulations, like the NSA and UAPA, have been used to curb dissent and criticisms, as pointed out by many free speech activists and democratic organisations.
As NATGRID becomes more embedded in everyday policing, its implications extend beyond counter-terrorism. Faster data access may improve investigation efficiency, but it also centralises unprecedented amounts of personal information within opaque systems. Without clear legislation, independent oversight and transparency on safeguards, concerns about accountability are likely to persist.
For now, NATGRID’s expansion reflects a broader trend: the steady normalisation of data-driven surveillance as a default tool of governance. Whether this shift can be balanced with constitutional protections and public trust remains an open question.
[DS]
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