This story written by Zulker Naeen and Rezwan originally appeared on Global Voices on February 14, 2026.
On February 12, 2026, Bangladesh held an election that many are calling a landmark democratic exercise, the first truly competitive vote the country has seen in nearly two decades. But beneath all the talk of a democratic fresh start and the restoration of electoral choice, there’s a tricky question lurking: what kind of democracy is this, really, and who gets to decide if it’s legitimate?
As the results started coming in after the voting ended, the center-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led alliance pulled off a landslide victory, picking up at least 212 out of the 299 seats counted. The far-right Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI)-led alliance followed as the second-largest bloc with around 77 seats, while the National Citizen Party, started by leaders of the 2024 uprising, made its parliamentary debut with six seats.
However, the BNP’s commanding victory with its two-thirds parliamentary majority raises fundamental questions not just about who won, but about what kind of democracy is actually taking shape. It might be called a “democracy of subtraction” — an election that achieved procedural fairness partly by excluding the party that governed for the previous fifteen years, but creates a paradox at the heart of claims about democratic legitimacy.
What unfolded across 42,779 polling centres that day was nothing less than a remarkable institutional achievement — a testament to coordinated state machinery, technological innovation, and the resilience of democratic aspirations in a nation long starved of genuine electoral choice.
The night before the election, Chief Adviser of the Interim government Dr. Muhammad Yunus went on television and urged everyone to make February 12 the “birthday of a new Bangladesh”, mentioning that it was the voters themselves who would write the country’s future.
In what marked the largest security mobilisation in Bangladesh’s electoral history, nearly 970,948 security personnel from every branch of law enforcement and the armed forces were stationed at polling centres and strategic locations nationwide. Every branch of the government’s security forces was involved, including over 100,000 from the army, around 5,000 from the navy, 3,730 air force personnel, more than 37,000 border guard troops, and close to 188,000 police officers.
On top of that, 1,051 executive magistrates were empowered to conduct mobile courts, creating immediate legal consequences for violations rather than waiting for post-election adjudication. In about 25,700 of the 43,000 polling centers, police wore body cameras, creating visual documentation of what happened, which helped keep both officials and security personnel accountable in real time.
With 127.7 million registered voters — including 64.8 million men, 62.9 million women, and 1,234 third-gender voters — this election represented one of the largest global democratic exercises of the year. Fifty registered political parties fielded 1,755 candidates, while 273 independent candidates also contested seats, providing voters with substantive choice. Among party nominees, 63 women candidates and 20 female independents participated.
Voter turnout landed at 59.44 percent — not quite the 80 to 87 percent seen in truly competitive elections decades ago, but still a significant jump from the disputed 41.8 percent reported in 2024. More importantly, it reflected real choice: people voted because they wanted to, not because they were persuaded or their ballots were fabricated.
The contest itself came down to a straight fight between the BNP and a Jamaat-e-Islami-led coalition that included the student-founded National Citizens Party. Simple as this setup was, voters still had a clear choice between two very different visions for the country.
When the results rolled in, the BNP-led alliance didn’t just win — they won big, grabbing 212 seats and a solid two-thirds majority. The Jamaat-e-Islami alliance’s 77 seats represented the best electoral performance in Jamaat’s history, positioning them as the main opposition.
Crucially, Jamaat Ameer Shafiqur Rahman demonstrated democratic maturity by gracefully conceding defeat, despite some objections. He mentioned that his party would “respect the results of the election, whatever they may be” and would not engage in obstructive opposition politics.
To really understand why the BNP won so convincingly, you have to look beyond electoral dynamics to how the votes actually played out. Bangladesh uses a first-past-the-post system, meaning candidates need only win more votes than their nearest competitor, not an absolute majority. It’s a setup the country inherited from British colonial rule, and it tends to give the winning party a major boost while smaller parties with scattered support get left behind.
As several analysts have noted, the final vote share will tell us a lot more about what really happened. In this kind of system, a party that pulls in 40 to 45 percent of the national vote can easily walk away with 65 to 70 percent of the seats if their support is efficiently distributed across constituencies. On the flip side, a party with 30 to 35 percent of the vote might end up with only 20 to 25 percent of the seats if their voters are geographically concentrated or spread too thinly. So the BNP’s landslide in seats doesn’t necessarily mean they won every voter’s heart; it means they won where it counted.
This mathematical reality means that the Jamaat-e-Islami alliance, despite achieving its best electoral performance in history, may have won a substantially larger share of popular support than its 77 seats suggest. If indeed the alliance captured 30-35 percent of the national vote as some projections indicate, it means millions of Bangladeshi voters supported parties that will exercise only limited influence in a parliament where the BNP commands two-thirds of seats.
These voters’ preferences will shape parliamentary debates and opposition strategies, but they have little prospect of influencing actual policy outcomes when the governing coalition can pass any legislation, including constitutional amendments, without opposition support.
The parallel referendum on the July National Charter added another layer of complexity and legitimacy to the electoral exercise. The charter proposed switching Bangladesh to a bicameral parliamentary system, putting two-term limits on future prime ministers, strengthening judicial independence, and building real checks on executive power.
The reported 65.5 percent support for the Charter in unofficial results suggests that voters engaged substantively with questions about bicameral systems, term limits, and institutional safeguards rather than simply rubber-stamping proposals.
The more revealing statistic might be the 34.5 percent who voted against constitutional reforms despite the overwhelming momentum in favour — a figure that likely represents hard-core opposition to the interim government’s entire project.
By tying the election to bigger questions about how the country should be run, it turned the energy of the 2024 July uprising into actual plans on paper, instead of letting it fizzle out as revolutionary talk.
Here’s where things get complicated. One of the strangest outcomes of this election is Jamaat-e-Islami’s comeback. The party that opposed Bangladesh’s independence back in 1971 and was banned for years has now turned in its best performance ever, becoming the main parliamentary opposition.
The fact that Bangladesh let Jamaat back into the political fold while keeping out the Awami League — a party that played a vital role in the country’s 1971 independence movement, but was banned from elections following a 2024 student-led uprising that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina — appears to be an uneven accommodation that reflects the political mood of the moment more than any consistent democratic principle.
With the Awami League barred from participating, Jamaat positioned itself as the main alternative for voters seeking a “new political force”. In a more inclusive electoral environment, Jamaat might have won substantially fewer seats; however, the particular circumstances of 2026 created opportunities the party exploited effectively.
With the referendum passed, big constitutional changes are expected to be on the way, though actually making it happen will require dedicated constitutional work. The fact that the BNP holding a two-thirds majority means the party will basically have the chance to write the rules however they want.
However, the first-past-the-post system’s distortions suggest that the distribution of parliamentary seats may not accurately reflect the popular will of the voters.
(GP)
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