Justices Muralidhar and Sreedharan faced punitive transfers for their judgements in opposition to the Centre's agenda.
Other cases, like the elevation of Justice Pancholi over several senior women judges, have highlighted preferntial treatment for those partial to the Union government.
These instances have raised questions on the judiciary's transparency, impartiality, and credibility.
On Saturday, 18 October 2025, Justice Atul Sreedharan was transferred from the Madhya Pradesh High Court to the Allahabad High Court, under recommendation of the Union government. The Supreme Court Collegium had earlier proposed posting him to Chhattisgarh but modified its decision at the government’s request. The Collegium made a rare public acknowledgment that reconsideration was sought by the Centre, which has reignited concerns about executive influence in judicial appointments.
Justice Sreedharan was originally recommended for transfer to the Chhattisgarh High Court in August 2025, where he would have been among the senior-most judges and part of the High Court Collegium responsible for recommending appointments. In October 2025, the Supreme Court Collegium, led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, altered the decision, posting him instead to Allahabad, where he will rank seventh and, therefore, be excluded from the Collegium’s decision making.
The resolution stated only that the change was made “on reconsideration sought by the Government.” No explanation was provided for why the executive objected to his Chhattisgarh posting, or why the Collegium, which has the constitutional authority to reiterate its recommendations, chose to acquiesce.
The development, recorded in a brief Collegium resolution dated 14 October 2025, is part of a growing series of instances that have drawn attention to the uneasy balance between the judiciary and the executive. It follows a pattern seen in the transfer of judges who have issued rulings critical of the government, most notably Justice S. Muralidhar’s move from the Delhi High Court to the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 2020, a decision that came within hours of his order directing Delhi Police to act against hate speech by political leaders during the Delhi riots.
Observers point out that the government’s request came months after Justice Sreedharan had ordered the registration of an FIR against a state minister for using communal slurs against an Army officer, Colonel Sofiya Qureshi. He had also taken suo motu cognisance of caste-based discrimination in Madhya Pradesh and questioned the misuse of preventive detention laws during his earlier tenure in Jammu and Kashmir, where he was known for upholding individual liberty and quashing illegal detentions under the Public Safety Act (PSA) and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).
During his time in J&K, Justice Sreedharan’s bench had repeatedly warned against “psychologically overawing” courts with arguments of nationalism or national security. His transfer back to Madhya Pradesh came just weeks before he was due to become Acting Chief Justice of the J&K High Court. Within months, he was again recommended for transfer, and then shifted, at the government’s request, to a court where his administrative influence would be minimal.
Legal scholars such as G. Mohan Gopal have described this as part of a larger effort “to fill High Courts with judges whose worldview is more comfortable for those in power.” Retired Justice M.B. Lokur, who had earlier opposed the transfer of Justice Muralidhar during his own tenure, said the practice of shifting judges for “inconvenient” decisions strikes at the root of judicial independence.
Justice Sreedharan’s experience mirrors that of Justice S. Muralidhar.
Justice Muralidhar had ordered urgent midnight hearings during the Delhi riots of 2020, pressing the police to register cases against political figures accused of hate speech. Hours later, the Centre notified his transfer to the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The move was decried publicly and sparked a rare show of outrage and solidarity from Delhi High Court lawyers, who hailed Muralidhar as a “judge of courage.”
During his subsequent tenure, Justice Muralidhar continued to emphasise the need for judicial accountability and institutional courage. His writings and speeches have since reflected on the growing pressure on judges to conform, the lack of transparency in transfers, and the creeping sense that independence was being redefined to align with political convenience.
The parallels between these episodes are hard to miss. Both judges were known for rulings that foregrounded liberty and constitutional accountability; both were transferred at critical junctures; and in both cases, the executive’s influence appeared to coincide with the judiciary’s restraint.
During his tenure, Justice Muralidhar often pointed to faultlines in the SC’s functioning. He has highlighted cases of caste discrimination and gender inequality practices by sitting judges. He has pointed to cases of ‘institutional amnesia’ where the court simply forgot about contentious issues, like the Babri Masjid case, for years before taking them up again suddenly. Finally and most relevant, he has demonstrated how several notable judgements have aligned with institutional positions.
In August 2025, after his retirement, Muralidhar doubled down on his criticisms of the judiciary with the release of his book [In]Complete Justice: The Supreme Court at 75. The book highlighted several notable judgements that failed to bring justice, like that of G.N. Saibaba, and argued that the court failed to implement binding judgements issued by, like in cases of ‘bulldozer justice’, thereby maintaining the status quo.
Justice Abhay S. Oka, in a lecture delivered earlier this year, captured the essence of the concern of institutional pressure. “Judges should be prepared to deliver judgments which are not liked by the popular majority,” he said, adding that morality for a judge lies in upholding the Constitution even when public or political opinion is hostile. Referring to the 2020 Delhi riots, he noted that “someday we have to consider whether the judges who met at midnight faced consequences for their bold decisions.” His observation underlined what many within the legal community see as a pattern: judges who assert independence often find themselves marginalised through transfers or overlooked for elevation.
These concerns have intensified with the recent elevation of Justice Vipul Manubhai Pancholi to the Supreme Court despite a dissent from Justice B.V. Nagarathna, the only woman on the current bench. Justice Nagarathna, who is due to become the first woman Chief Justice of India in 2027, reportedly objected to Justice Pancholi’s elevation on grounds of seniority and credibility, pointing out that his appointment superseded several senior judges, including multiple women.
Justice Pancholi ranks 57th on the all-India seniority list of High Court judges. His elevation, approved within two days by the Union government, has been criticised by observers and advocacy groups as a step backward for transparency and gender representation.
Justice Nagarathna’s dissent, one of the rare formal objections within the Collegium system, warned that such decisions risk eroding “whatever credibility the collegium system still holds.” Her objection also noted that Justice Pancholi’s earlier transfer from Gujarat to Patna was “not a routine transfer,” suggesting that his selection overlooked prior administrative concerns.
The Collegium, however, offered no public reasoning—earlier resolutions routinely cited seniority, regional balance, and diversity considerations, but these have now reverted to terse one-paragraph statements.
Justice Oka’s remarks, Justice Nagarathna’s dissent, and the Sreedharan and Muralidhar episodes are all connected by a single theme: the fragility of judicial independence in the face of institutional and political pressure. The opaque processes underlying these incidents also undermines public confidence in the judiciary.
“Something which is legal and constitutional is moral, and something which is not legal and constitutional is immoral,” Justice Oka said, underscoring that the judiciary’s moral compass lies in fidelity to the Constitution, not popularity. But the present cycle of transfers and appointments suggests that this principle is being tested repeatedly.
Justice Sreedharan’s reassignment, the government’s role in his transfer, and the Collegium’s silence on reasons have revived calls for reforming the process itself. Advocacy groups like the Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms (CJAR) have reminded the Court that “transfers are to be in public interest and to protect the institution of the judiciary, not the convenience or interests of the Union Government.”
The argument extends beyond individual cases. The elevation of Justice Pancholi, bypassing senior women judges such as Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal, Justice Revati Mohite Dere, and Justice Lisa Gill, has reinforced the perception that merit and representation are being subordinated to institutional politics. Meanwhile, the pattern of delayed or selective appointments: from the case of Senior Advocate Saurabh Kirpal, whose recommendation has remained pending for years, to the exclusion of judges with reputations for independence, points to a systemic imbalance between the judiciary’s formal autonomy and the executive’s informal leverage.
The opacity surrounding judicial appointments and transfers is not new. Former Supreme Court judge Ruma Pal once described the process as “possibly the best-kept secret in the country.” Justice Jasti Chelameswar’s dissent in the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) case similarly questioned whether the judiciary had replaced political dependence with internal patronage.
The swift government approval of contentious appointments, contrasted with delays in less controversial ones, has further fuelled speculation of informal coordination between the executive and the judiciary; a perception that undermines both.
Former Supreme Court judge M.B. Lokur, referring to the earlier episode involving Justice Muralidhar, once remarked that transfers used as tools of reprisal “damage the institution more than any external criticism ever could.” That sentiment resonates today.
The collegium’s role, originally conceived as a safeguard against executive overreach, now finds itself accused of internal opacity and selective compliance. The government’s ability to influence outcomes through delay, silence, or “reconsideration” requests has exposed the vulnerabilities of the system.
In the end, the issue is not confined to one judge or one transfer. It is about the credibility of the judicial process itself: about whether judges can continue to rule without fear or favour in a system that appears to punish independence and reward conformity.
Justice Atul Sreedharan’s transfer, Justice Muralidhar’s reassignment, and Justice Nagarathna’s dissent are markers of a deeper institutional crisis. Meanhwhile, judges who have passed orders in favour of the Centre have been met with preferential treatment, and those that ideologically align with the ruling party's agenda seemigly make thair way up the judicial ladder with ease.
Each case reflects a different dimension of the same problem: the erosion of transparent reasoning in judicial administration and the encroachment of executive preference into spaces constitutionally meant to remain independent.
As Justice Oka reminded his audience, judges “must be prepared to deliver judgments which are not liked by the popular majority.” The test for the judiciary now is whether it can sustain that courage; not just in its verdicts, but in defending its own freedom to decide who sits in judgment. [OG/DS]